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Political campaigns in the UK in many ways are a blend of traditions from European party systems 
with aspects influenced by the more US candidate-centred model. There are two reasons for this. 
Firstly, the UK first past the post system where candidates stand for election as individuals in 
constituencies, the candidate who has most votes being elected, encourages a more individualistic 
style of campaigning at the local level (Ward & Southern, 2012). Secondly, party leaders since the 
Thatcher era have been argued to have adopted a more presidential style, so are central to the 
campaign. That said, largely web-based campaigning follows a party-centric model where the party 
rather than the leader has a set of domains across platforms (websites and linked presences on 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube mainly), though some local candidates will independently create 
their own presences across the Internet. UK campaigns therefore have potential to be innovative in 
their use of social media and to present voters with multiple means of interacting with the 
individuals and their parties who seek their vote. 
In order to explore the adoption and use of social media during election campaigns in the UK this 
chapter draws on three data sets. Firstly a longitudinal analysis of website and web presence 
features which allows us to track the use of the Internet by the major political parties across the 
local elections of 2008, subsequent European Parliamentary Election (2009), General Election (2010) 
and the most recent contest the 2014 European Parliamentary Election. The parties selected for 
analysis present a cross-section of the UK political scene. Labour were party of government from 
1997-2010 and subsequently the main opposition, the Conservatives were opposition until 2010 and 
subsequently major partners in a coalition with the third largest party in terms of popular vote, the 
Liberal Democrats. The Green Party have a long history as a campaigning organisation but only 
gained their first MP in 2010 but have always had representation in councils and the European 
Parliament. The other two parties have no parliamentary representation but stand nationally and 
have had significant impact on the news agenda, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) are a 
conservative and Eurosceptic party who consistently do well in the popular vote at European 
Parliamentary Elections, the British National Party are the far-right, neo-fascist party who are most 
innovative historically online and had two MEPs until 2014.  
The second data set is from interviews with party strategists which asked them to prioritise different 
elements in order to define a 21st Century professional campaign. This chapter draws only on data 
that compares the prioritisation of different media use (online and offline) to identify how social 
media are embedded strategically within a campaign. Finally the chapter draws on data from social 
media pages which analyses the usage of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube by the six major parties, 
assessing how social media offers each party reach and how reach (in terms of followers and page 
views) corresponds with strategies. This data will focus on the aftermath of the European Elections 
and provides insights into the role social media might play in the UK General Election which will take 
place in 2015. Prior to introducing this data the chapter provides a brief summary of research on 
web campaigning in the UK up to 2008 and the role the Internet has been argued to play as a 
campaign tool. 
UK online election campaigning: slow on the uptake 
One chapter of the annual Political Communications collection in 1997 asked if this was the first 
Internet election, with the response being no (Ward & Gibson, 1997). Reviewing Internet use, the 
authors of the first scientific study of UK parties’online election campaigning concluded that UK were 
recognizing the Internet's potential for increasing internal party debate, so perhaps connecting 
better to members and likewise connecting them to the party. However, while debate was 
facilitated, party websites were utilised primarily as a tool for downward information dissemination. 
Although there was evidence to support equalisation in terms of parties with lower levels of support 
having similar or equal quality websites as their higher-resourced counterparts, limited Internet use 
by the electorate hindered websites being exploited to its fullest extent (Gibson & Ward, 1998). By 
2001 inequalities had increased, but innovation was purely within the realm of sophistication. Party 
websites looked better and were more user friendly but the content was largely shovelware, 
material from leaflets and other documents stored online in case anyone wanted to view them. 
Largely there seemed no great sense of strategy of who might visit a party website and so what they 
might want to find (Gibson et al, 2003; Gibson, Ward & Lusoli, 2003).  
The European Parliamentary elections of 2004 showed little reason for optimism. Evidence showed 
the online campaign, or rather the lack of a campaign, largely reflected the apathy of national 
politicians and the media with the second-order election (Lusoli & Ward, 2005). Parties provided 
informational content mirroring the by then longstanding tradition of shovelware content. Although 
perhaps this would be expected of a second-order contest, which five years later also demonstrated 
lower effort devoted to the campaign (Maier, Strömbäck & Kaid 2011), the 2005 campaign also 
relied largely on television and news management (Jackson, 2007). There was little sense across the 
contests 1997-2005 that the Internet was going to fulfil the potential some suggested it had, though 
there was evidence that supporter mobilisation was increasingly a function of web presences (Norris 
& Curtice, 2008) and weblogs became a feature so allowing flexibility in messaging and gaining 
feedback (Jackson, 2006). Therefore, one should not view the parties as being cautious and so 
reluctant to innovate, but in the UK as across Europe this may not be unexpected given that a small 
percentage used the Internet as a source of political information (Lusoli, 2005). 
Although many individual MPs may have seen benefits from a more personalised campaign and so 
developed an Internet presence, this was also unrealised. Using the catchy title ‘from weird to 
wired’, one of the first studies of UK MPs shows few dabbled with the Internet (Ward & Lusoli, 
2005). There were one or two pioneers who metaphorically dipped their toe into online 
campaigning, creating weblogs (Stanyer, 2006), developing websites (Norton, 2007) and interacting 
with constituents via email (Allan, 2006) but these were exemplars outside of the norm. 
Furthermore as most MPs’ websites were paid for out of their parliamentary communication budget 
they could not be used for election campaigns, though a few used them to highlight their 
achievements in parliament on behalf of their constituency or to explain their voting record (Lilleker, 
2005). However, beyond isolated examples, there seemed little to indicate that the Internet would 
be taken seriously as a campaign tool or be used to do anything particularly innovative in the UK.  
The evolution of online campaigning 2008-2014 
Of course one cannot ignore the fact there were innovations, and that parties were experimenting 
with a range of features that may appear basic now but at the time were providing data that would 
shape later behaviour. Party e-newsletters, and the finding that their subscribers wanted to not just 
read but give feedback, showed there might be rewards from offering greater involvement through 
interactivity (Jackson & Lilleker, 2007). Simultaneously Howard Dean’s campaign in the US in 2004, 
and the campaigns in France by Segolene Royal, who harnessed a personal blogosphere and had a 
co-authored manifesto, and Nicolas Sarkozy who dabbled in Second Life to offer a test drive of his 
leadership (Lilleker & Malagon, 2010) influenced those within UK parties who sought ways to appear 
more modern, more innovative and to gain greater attention and so support at the voting booth. 
Uncharacteristically this meant that the contests for the local councils in 2008 and the 2009 
European Parliamentary election became testing grounds for innovations in online campaigning, 
with the social aspect emphasised to an unprecedented and unexpected degree. 
The studies undertaken involved a content analysis, or feature analysis, of websites; a method 
pioneered by Gibson and Ward (2000) when analysing party and candidate websites at the turn of 
the century. Our methodology detects the presence of features, with a coding scheme updated to 
include links to and content on social media platforms. The features were rated for direction of 
communication (monologue, two-way feedback, or participatory) and for level of user control (rated 
1-10); so for example press releases, a common feature of early websites were one-way and offered 
minimal control, read or not; in contrast a social media profile where comments were allowed is 
participatory and permitting the maximum level of user control where they might like, share, 
comment or enter into conversation with the profile host or other visitors. Averages for web 
presences were created to permit simple comparability.  
2008, a period when there were local council elections saw interesting innovations. This period was 
just after the widespread social adoption of MySpace and Facebook and the introduction of Web 2.0 
as a concept explaining interactive communication. Parties were seen to adopt a range of features 
that fitted into the Web 2.0 framework, so building architecture for websites that permitted 
participation. However, largely the parties themselves had no representation within the interaction. 
The parties provided a news feed, invited responses via email or online forms and allowed 
comments, yet they did not respond to questions and often there was little sense that social media 
platforms were monitored. For some parties, in particular the BNP, the MySpace profile had no 
content and users of the platform were allowed to join, post a hostile remark (such as fascist scum) 
then leave. Hence the conclusion was that UK political parties actually resided within Web 1.5. Their 
online presences offered the look and feel of Web 2.0, provided space for visitors to correspond, but 
the parties largely retained the control offered in Web 1.0. This halfway house approach led many 
visitors to use social media profile walls for ‘graffiti’, they posted a comment that could be positive 
or hostile and seemed never to return, perhaps due to them not gaining a response. 
This approach remained largely the same with the European Parliamentary election in 2009. The 
web presences built for the contest emphasised resource inequalities, with the major parties 
innovating in more sophisticated ways than minor or fringe parties. However when comparing the 
features used, their functionality and the level of control awarded to site visitors in being able to 
post, comment and interact it was actually two far-right fringe parties and UKIP which offered 
visitors the most freedom, these were followed by Labour then party of government. We suggested, 
therefore, a strategic focus on Internet campaigning was emerging (Jackson & Lilleker, 2010). The 
four most interactive parties were ambitious to increase their vote share, or in the case of Labour 
limit their decline at the next General Election and so were developing ways to enhance the 
relationship with their grassroots and tentative supporters and so used the online environment as a 
greenhouse for nurturing support (Albrecht, 2007).  
Perhaps it was the influence of Obama that led some parties to reconsider their adherence to Web 
1.5, perhaps it was a combination of desperation and caution surrounding the close 2010 General 
Election contest that determined strategies; insights from party strategists suggested something of 
both. However the divergence in strategies was striking (Lilleker & Jackson, 2011). UKIP largely 
eschewed any social aspects, focusing on older voters not expected to be online, though they did 
have some members who regularly blogged. The Greens, constrained by resources, offered little 
onsite interaction but provided some engaging features such as a customisable video that could be 
shared via Facebook. Labour retreated somewhat, although the ‘Change We See’ campaign 
permitted supporters to upload pictures that encapsulated Labour’s achievements over their 
thirteen years of government and the #Labourdoorstep Twitter campaign was important in 
mobilising their activists. But these were minor innovations compared to the Obama-style social 
network created by the Conservative Party (myConservatives.co.uk) or the Liberal Democrat’s Forum 
(LibDemAct), these allowed visitors who wished to sign up to write directly to the websites, creating 
content and shaping the experiences of future visitors. The Greens, Labour, Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats also utilised Facebook, Twitter and YouTube so creating multiple points of entry 
and participation to their campaign. Yet, the British National Party offered an even more 
participatory experience. Their website consisted of participatory architecture that gave members a 
role in creating the campaign. Around 1,500 members, using pseudonyms, contributed detail on 
local campaigns, supportive examples for the anti-immigrant and homophobic platform and attacks 
on the other parties. The BNP avoided other social networks, and there were controls over joining 
and posting, but the parties was the closest to a Web 2.0 campaign and embraced the philosophy of 
the social web by creating their own social media platform while most other parties relied on the 
free platforms.  
Given this level of innovation one might expect further advances between 2010 and 2014. In 
contrast, as shown in Figures 1 and 2 we find in 2014 almost complete convergence around a mixed 
communication strategy that offers varying levels of control and varying directions of 
communication. The differences are minor, for example the Liberal Democrats do not have an online 
shop, the Green Party only have an online mechanism for volunteering, the BNP and UKIP do not 
encourage emails to the party. But all interactive elements are gone from the sites, so for specific 
websites user control is low and the communication one-way or in places two-way. Rather the free 
spaces offered by the Facebook, Twitter and YouTube platforms are utilised exclusively to allow 
participatory communication and for visitors to have control over communication. Therefore social 
media, by 2014, are the one place where supporters can interact with one another and, in theory, 
with the party. Only the BNP site allows commenting within their news section which features 
weblog tools, all the other parties encourage sharing their pages and joining their presences on 
social media platforms. The retrenchment could be a reflection of the second-order status of the 
European parliamentary election. However it might also suggest recognition that the website has 
greater use for supporters, allowing them to donate, download material for printing, or promoting 
the party online. Social media may attract a looser support base into a community that can then be 
mobilised. The functionality is similar to the bespoke social network created by Obama (Woolley, 
Limperos & Oliver, 2010), but costs little, does not require large levels of resources for monitoring, 
as some believe social media to be anarchic and uncontrollable anyway so would not expect all 
comments to be on message. The website, however, remains simple, clean of clutter and largely 
utilised to disseminate simple messages and brand information in the form of images, soundbites 
and policy promises. This strategy may reflect the priorities UK party strategists place upon different 
platforms and media. 
Figures 1 and 2 about here please 
Social media: just another mass medium? 
The data for this section draws on a survey, conducted either face-to-face, via telephone or in one 
case via email with the individual responsible for designing and overseeing the campaign strategy for 
the 2014 European parliament and 2015 general election strategies for each of the major UK parties, 
the BNP refused to respond to this and so there is no data on that party. The titles differed across 
parties, from party leader to communication and campaign manager, however each had a unique 
perspective on where their party stood in relation to voters and the challenge they faced at 
forthcoming electoral contests, the objectives the party had set and how these were best achieved. 
For each means of communication they gave a score from 1-5, denoting its relative importance and 
so allowing means to be derived which are compared in this case across parties. The means are 
generated from two distinct sets of questions, one set on priorities for the 2014 European 
parliamentary election; the second for the forthcoming general election, in the case of advertising 
this is cumulative for prioritising print, online and television advertisements. 
The mean scores, shown in Table 1, offer some indications of the different priorities parties have 
when viewing different means for communication to and with their potential voters. Face-to-face 
communication is the priority for all but there are divergences across traditional and social media. 
Major parties see news (an up-to-date presence in the media and having an impact on the agenda) 
as of significant importance; the two minor parties recognise the difficulty in achieving positive or 
balanced news coverage. The two parliamentary opposition parties, Labour and the Greens, 
although the latter only has one MP, both rate social media as highly important; UKIP due to their 
more conservative, older and working class target electorate prefer a ground, street-level campaign. 
Labour appear to be prioritising all forms of communication, perhaps as they are trying to build 
positive awareness for their new leader and have struggled to build a strong public image despite 
them earning a respectable standing in the polls. 
Overall, however, there is a general pattern across the UK parties. The gold standard for 
communication is face-to-face, hence the importance of canvassing and, within the marginal 
constituencies, local and national party luminaries are highly visible throughout a campaign (Lilleker, 
2005). The second priority is likely to be mass media, and in particular appearances on regional and 
national news, so suggesting these give the party and its candidate’s prominence as well as allowing 
them to set the news agenda. Thirdly is email, perhaps for hard to reach groups but particularly as a 
tool for inter-party communication. Social media reinforces these activities but only the Green party 
place it as a highly important medium, notwithstanding the prioritisation of face-to-face 
communication. For most parties there is a respect for the role of social media in a campaign, 
however there is a level of uncertainty as to the potential advantages and disadvantages of social 
media campaigning. 
Caught in the social web: party use of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube 
Table 2 shows the reach the six parties enjoy, with this representing the number of likes (on 
Facebook fan pages) followers (on Twitter) and subscribers (to YouTube channels). Reach is 
important as it suggests, at the very least the number of people willing to receive direct 
communication from each party, including having material pushed at them. The numbers represent 
the immediate audience each party can reach by social media but not the networks they might have 
access to, or reach into, should their online supporters like and share the party posts, videos and 
images. The picture is disparate to some extent with the likes, followers and subscribers largely 
mirroring recent electoral results. We therefore see the Conservatives and UKIP having the largest 
following on Facebook, Labour beating the Conservatives on Twitter slightly with the Liberal 
Democrats, Greens and UKIP with half their following and with little between them. UKIP win hands 
down on YouTube with the rest of the parties with under 10,000 subscribers led by Labour. The BNP 
have a strong following on Facebook but seem to be nowhere across the other platforms. Largely 
politics as usual is supported here, with the current hype around, and support for, UKIP being 
mirrored online with the two traditional rivals for government in close proximity to them depending 
upon the channel; the question is whether there are alternative explanations for the levels of 
support? 
In terms of the effort parties make in communicating via these platforms there seems no 
correspondence between the number of posts, tweets or videos and the likes, follows or subscribers 
earned, the figures in brackets in Table 2 denote effort in terms of material created during the 2014 
European parliamentary election campaign when one might expect activity to be at its greatest. 
Therefore, in terms of the adage that producing content equally might generate a following it would 
seem erroneous, in particular given that the Green Party created most content for both Twitter and 
YouTube but do not have an equitable level of following.  
In terms of the type of content, all parties treat social media as a news feed. The profiles across 
platforms for all parties are largely a repository for current videos, or with Twitter links to a video, 
the latest line from the party leader, or updates about events and inviting members. The exception 
is the BNP who select news stories and put their nationalist spin on these, so pushing the image they 
promote as representing Britishness. If the party shares material it is from their leader’s pages or 
profiles, or for the major parties other prominent spokespersons.  
Facebook offers the opportunity to see the extent of likes, shares and comments received as well as 
whether the party or any notable and obvious figure from the party responds. Table 3 shows the 
numbers of page likes and then for the 2014 contest period the number of likes on posts, the 
number of shares of posts and the number of comments. The only observation that can be made 
from this data is that, unless the party is a member of the coalition (the Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats) the size of support is also an indicator of the level of expected activity with, on the 
whole, a large number liking, a smaller number sharing and yet fewer commenting. The commenting 
figure is however spurious, as on some posts there are numerous interactions between a small 
number of participants as opposed to a stream of comments each from a single individual. What is 
striking however is that at no time does the party respond (or rather the individual or individuals 
who manage the Facebook profile and speak as the party) nor do any of the top party personnel 
feature in responding to posts or comment posted by their supporters. Even when, as in the case of 
the Conservatives, many of those who have liked their page are saying in comments they are 
unconvinced by Conservative party promises and will vote for UKIP, there is no attempt by the party 
to prevent this erosion of votes. While the party activity seems to encourage graffiti, it is only due to 
the energy of those who comment that some form of interest is sustained. It may be that parties 
view these pages simply as ways to gather data about their supporters and their opinions, and that 
has value. However, as noted in empirical studies, it would appear they are missing a trick in not 
communicating back and building relationships with their online supporters (Jackson & Lilleker, 
2009). 
The UK social media campaign: evolution and devolution, never revolution 
The long history of online campaigning, albeit covering only seventeen years, demonstrates a 
greater sense of caution than a desire to be innovative. Indeed the decade of reliance on shovelware 
perhaps indicates that UK parties see voters and supporters as individuals who need informing and 
persuading in equal measure but not talking with online. This may be an indication that all parties 
are unsure of the impact of interaction, how to deal with the demands of their online community of 
loose supporters, and are concerned about the extent that the party may have to accommodate 
them more at the expense of usual decision making processes (Lilleker, Pack & Jackson, 2010). 
Innovation appears to have been ushered in on the back of influences from across the channel and 
then from over the Atlantic, but it was short-lived. It was also unsuccessful, with the 
myConservatives social network having very few members and even less activism (Lilleker & Jackson, 
2010: 135), suggesting the O’Reilly adage ‘build it and they will come’ is reliant on context.  
It is therefore unsurprising that parties turn to free platforms, as do many corporate and not-for-
profit entities, as they require little effort, low-level monitoring, and are places where the people 
already go. As one veteran campaigner commented “the website is a side street, people only go 
there to visit someone when invited; Facebook and Twitter are the high street, everyone passes 
through nowadays, and if you do something interesting people may stop to take a look”. While there 
still needs a pull to any profile there is some logic to the statement. It is therefore unsurprising that 
we find mixed views on social media as a priority channel but that all, except UKIP, rate it as an 
above average priority. It is also important to note that UKIP used social media extensively, and 
gathered a significant following. So despite these media being a low priority in the lead up to the 
2014 contest this perception may change for the 2015 general election when their goal is their first 
seat in the national parliament. It is also interesting to note, of the 50 parties that stood across the 
UK for election to the European Parliament 26 had a Facebook profile, 29 used Twitter and 32 a 
YouTube channel. These figures suggest that social media is embedded in UK campaigning and is a 
de rigueur feature for any party seeking to be taken seriously and seeking to reach out to the 
electorate. 
Yet in truth little beyond adoption of these platforms is innovative. Social media are simply used to 
replicate tasks of old media, it is a form of online advertising with some elements of recruitment 
built in. There seem few attempts to convert supporters into more active advocates or campaigners 
despite visitors’ apparent willingness to like, share and comment on the material of the party. Even 
more surprising it would appear many comments are unread (as some insult the party leaders on 
personal and professional grounds) and are never responded to. Perhaps Facebook, in particular, is 
perceived as a place for supporters to keep in touch with what the party is doing and with one 
another; however erroneous that perception might be. Therefore, while UK parties have embraced 
social media and use them regularly, their use remains in the realm of Web 1.5. They facilitate 
participatory interaction but seldom participate themselves. Hence we might view the UK party 
experience with social media as one of cautious experimentation, followed by some innovation but 
ending with convergence around the most basic usage. This is not a normative judgement and 
criticism, but it does raise a question; is this appropriate usage of social media, or at least 
appropriate for a political party, and if not what is an effective model of usage that may lead to a 
more social, interactive and accessible form of politics? The medium may have changed but the 
political mindset has not, it may be fear of losing control of communication, having to answer the 
tough questions in public or it may be a more primal fear that politicians experience (Stromer-Galley, 
2000). In setting out why politicians must be independent legislators and not delegates Edmund 
Burke argued “When the leaders choose to make themselves bidders at an auction of popularity, 
their talents, in the construction of the state, will be of no service. They will become flatterers 
instead of legislators; the instruments, not the guides, of the people”; perhaps for many politicians 
the fear is that moving closer to their online supporters will lead to just such impulses. Hence 
communication remains two-way at best, private and under the control of UK parties even when 
they colonise platforms designed for social interaction and conversation. 
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Figure 1: Mean Direction of Communication (one-way, two-way or participatory) compared across 
contests 2008-2014 
 
Figure 2: Mean User Control (low 1-10 very high) compared across contests 2008-2014 
 
  
Table 1: Means scores, by communication means, by party 
 News TV 
Spots 
Other 
Ads 
Website Email Face-to-
Face 
Facebook Twitter YouTube 
Cons 4.5 4.0 3.7 4.5 2.0 5.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Lab 5.0 4.5 4.2 5.0 4.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
LibDem 5.0 3.0 3.2 4.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 
UKIP 3.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 3.0 5.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Green 3.0 1.0 2.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 
 
Table 2: Social media reach by party 
 Facebook  Twitter  YouTube  
Cons 223,180 (29) 113,649 (59) 6,953 (3) 
Lab 176,979 (33) 141,419 (335) 7,360 (3) 
LibDem 97,219 (26) 65,878 (482) 3,328 (11) 
UKIP 219,285 (46) 62,494 (265) 19,802 (1) 
Green 67,068 (46) 63,842 (578) 2,522 (17) 
BNP 151,837 (86) 7,813 (181) 5,656 (9) 
 
Table 3: Reach and visible support on Facebook 
 Page Likes Likes of Posts Shares of Posts Comments on 
Posts 
Cons 223,180 10,325 4,130 5,741 
Lab 176,979 41,917 16,767 10,858 
LibDem 97,219 8,250 3,300 3,015 
UKIP 219,285 91,480 60,987 50,292 
Green 67,068 30,512 12,205 2,647  
BNP 151,837 133,056 73,920 13,851 
 
